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Abstract
Does oﬃcial aid pave the road for private foreign investment or does it suﬀocate
private initiative by diverting resources towards unproductive activities? In this paper
we explore this question using data for a large number of developing and emerging
economies. Controlling for countries’ institutional environment, we ﬁnd that, evaluated
at the mean, the marginal eﬀect of aid on private foreign investment is close to zero.
Surprisingly, however, the eﬀect is strictly positive for countries in which private agents
face a substantial regulatory burden. After testing the robustness of this result, we
oﬀer a theoretical model that is able to rationalize our puzzling observation.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Does oﬃcial aid pave the road for private foreign investment or does it suﬀocate private
initiative by diverting resources towards unproductive activities?
There are good reasons to believe in the ﬁrst possibility: if governments lack a domestic
tax base and if they do not have access to international capital markets, foreign aid can
provide them with the means to oﬀer the infrastructure and the educational system that
are necessary for proﬁtable economic activity. By closing various “gaps” (Chenery and
Strout 1966), aid may thus act as a catalyst for private capital ﬂows. Moreover, large
aid ﬂows can indicate that a government’s economic policy is approved by international
organiziations, and this positive signal may raise the country’s attractiveness for foreign
investors (Rodrik 1995). In sum, “foreign aid to a reforming government may improve the
environment for private investment — both by creating conﬁdence in the reform program
and by helping ease infrastructure bottlenecks” (Dollar and Easterly 1999:22).
However, there are also good reasons to be skeptical about the beneﬁts of foreign aid.
Against the background of the rather frustrating results of foreign aid during the sixties
and seventies, several authors have argued that large aid ﬂows, instead of jump-starting
economic growth in developing countries, mainly lead to a massive increase in unproductive
rent-seeking activities: “Because aid accrues to the government it increases its resources,
patronage, and power in relation to the rest of society. The resulting politicization of
life enhances the hold of governments over their subjects and increases the stakes in the
struggle for power. This result in turn encourages or even forces people to divert attention,
energy, and resources from productive economic activities to concern with the outcome
of political and administrative processes and decisions” (Bauer 1991:45).1 Moreover, the
easy availability of grants may prevent governments from undertaking necessary reforms.
As a result, aid may deter rather than attract foreign investors.
The two countervailing forces described in the preceding paragraphs may be high-
1A related point was made by Milton Friedman (1958, 1970:64) who warned that aid would “almost
surely retard economic development and promote the triumph of Communism”. (quoted from Lensink and
White 2000:48)
2lighted by the following simple model. Suppose that aggregate output Y is a function of a
productivity parameter Ω, physical capital K, labor L, and some publicly provided input
G. More speciﬁcally,
Y = ΩF (K,L,G), (1)
with F as a strictly concave function that is increasing in all its arguments and has
the cross parital derivative FKG > 0.2 Suppose, in addition, that G is partly ﬁnanced
by foreign aid A and that aid reduces total factor productivity Ω. Hence, G = g(A)
with g0 > 0 and Ω = f (A) with f0 < 0.O b v i o u s l y ,t h et o t a le ﬀect of raising A on the
marginal productivity of physical capital is ambiguous, and it depends on the strength
of the (positive) “infrastructure eﬀect” relative to the (negative) “rent-seeking eﬀect”
whether higher aid enhances or reduces countries’ attractiveness for foreign investors.
The aim of this paper is to empirically explore this issue. That is, we want to test
whether the eﬀect of oﬃcial aid on private foreign investment is positive, negative, or
absent. In our investigation, we are particularly interested in the role of countries’ “in-
stitutional and political environment”, i.e. the quality and stability of its political regime
and the eﬃciency of its legal and regulatory system. The importance of accounting for
political and institutional factors when assessing the eﬀect of aid on economic growth has
recently been demonstrated by Burnside and Dollar (2000, henceforth BD). Their results
show that, on the one hand, the marginal eﬀect of aid on economic growth is positive
when aid ﬂows meet a healthy policy environment. On the other hand, aid is ineﬀective if
a country is characterized by various symptoms of government failure like high inﬂation,
large budget deﬁcits, and restricted trade. While the ﬁndings of BD have been subject
to criticism (Hansen and Tarp 2000, 2001), they have become extremely inﬂuential, and
in the meantime the view that “money matters - in a good institutional environment”
(World Bank 1998) has entered conventional wisdom. This is not surprising. What makes
the BD result attractive to both policymakers and academics is that it synthesizes the
two seemingly contradictory points of view sketched above: by oﬀering institutional and
2See Barro (1990) for a prominent paper using such a setup, Clarida (1993) for an open-economy
version, and Reinikka and Svensson (2002) for recent evidence on the importance of public infrastructure
for private investment.
3policy characteristics as the missing link between the observed micro-eﬀectiveness and the
apparent macro-failure of aid, BD reconcile the view that foreign aid can be good for
growth with the more critical attitude of the skeptics.3
We started our empirical investigation with the conjecture that what is good for growth
should also be good for private foreign investment. Hence, we expected the negative “rent-
seeking eﬀect” of aid to dominate the positive “infrastructure eﬀect” in countries with a
bad institutional environment. To our great surprise, however, this is not what we found:
instead, our results suggest that while the marginal eﬀect of oﬃcial aid on private for-
eign investment is close to zero for a country with average institutional characteristics,
it is strictly positive in economies which hamper private activities by imposing a high
regulatory burden. While this does not imply that crippling regulation is good for foreign
investors — in fact, our empirical results show that the eﬀect of a high regulatory burden
is strongly negative — it is in striking contrast to the ﬁndings of BD. It suggests that, in-
deed, aid money matters for private foreign investment. But more so in a bad institutional
environment.
While we ﬁrst thought that our results might be due to an error in the econometric
approach — the consequence of some misspeciﬁcation or endogeneity — they turned out to
be stubbornly robust across samples and speciﬁcations, and we ﬁnally started to search
for a possible rationale. In terms of the framework sketched above, the explanation we
oﬀer can be summarized as follows: while a heavy regulatory burden may enhance the
negative rent-seeking eﬀect of aid, it also reinforces the positive infrastructure eﬀect. The
reason is that, if the private sector is prevented from producing nontraded inputs which
are necessary in production, aid-ﬁnanced public provision has a stronger eﬀect on the
marginal productivity of capital than in an environment where no such barriers exist.
Again, we need to stress that this should not be (mis-)interpreted as an appraisal of heavy
regulation. Instead, it is a second-best argument which states that, for given constraints
on private-sector activity, aid may enable governments to do things that nobody would do
otherwise.
3For a discussion of the micro- and macro-eﬀectiveness of foreign aid see Cassen et al. (1994) and
Mosley and Eeckhout (2000).
4The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section oﬀers a brief review of the
relevant literature. In Section 3, we describe our data. Section 4 presents our econometric
approach, our main results, and a series of robustness checks. In Section 5 we extend the
basic framework sketched above and develop a simple model that can explain our puzzling
observations. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Relevant literature
Our investigation beneﬁts from three strands of literature: the huge number of contribu-
tions analyzing the eﬀectiveness of foreign aid, the no less voluminous set of investigations
about the determinants of foreign capital ﬂows and, ﬁnally, a number of papers studying
the relationship between aid and private investment.
Hansen and Tarp (2000) provide a recent survey of the literature on the macroeconomic
eﬀects of aid. In particular, they review “third generation studies” which control for the
institutional environment when assessing the inﬂuence of aid on investment and economic
growth. While Boone (1996) comes to the conclusion that there is no signiﬁcant rela-
tionship, Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Svensson (1999) as well as Dollar and Easterly
(1999) control for the political and institutional environment by using interactive terms.
As mentioned above, their result that “money matters - in a healthy political/institutional
environment” was popularized in a recent study by the World Bank (1998). However, the
BD ﬁndings have not been uncontroversial. In fact, Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) point
out that the nonlinear eﬀect of aid may just be due to misspeciﬁcation and a failure to
properly account for endogeneity.
In specifying our econometric model, we have also been inspired by exisiting studies on
the determinants of private foreign investment.4 In particular, we follow a tradition to take
into account political and institutional variables that was started by Schneider and Frey
(1985) and Wheeler and Mody (1992). More recently, Jun and Singh (1996), Gastanaga et
al. (1998), Wei (2000), Harms (2002) as well as Harms and Ursprung (2002) demonstrated
the importance of the institutional and political environment for foreign direct investment
4See Chakrabarti (2001) for a critical survey of the recent literature.
5decisions.
Finally, our study complements a number of recent contributions that explore the rela-
tionship between oﬃcial lending and private capital ﬂows. While Rodrik (1995) does not
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of total oﬃcial lending on private capital ﬂows, his disaggregation
of the data reveals that bilateral transfers (including grants) enhance foreign direct in-
vestment, while increases in multilateral lending seem to follow declines in private capital
ﬂows. Similar to Rodrik (1995), Bird and Rowlands (1997) do not ﬁnd a robust relation-
ship between oﬃcial and private lending. In contrast, Ratha (2001) points out that while
the contemporaneous relationship between multilateral lending and private capital ﬂows
may be negative, multilateral lending can have a positive eﬀect on future private capital
ﬂows. One reason why previous authors have not found a signiﬁcant relationship between
oﬃcial ﬂows and private foreign investment may be their neglect of political and insti-
tutional conditions in the receiving countries. Our study ﬁlls this gap, and we therefore
believe that it can substantially contribute to a better understanding of the interaction
between oﬃcial resource ﬂows and private capital ﬂows.
3 Data and econometric model
3.1 Dependent variable
Our dependent variable “private foreign investment” (PFI)i st h es u mo fnet foreign
direct investment inﬂows (FDI) and portfolio equity investment inﬂows as reported on
the CD-Rom version of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2001 (World
Bank 2001a; henceforth WDI2001). Both variables are measured in current US dollars.
Our decision to add these two categories instead of focusing on FDI alone is motivated
by the insight that, in reality, it is hard to distinguish between direct and portfolio equity
investment. Thus, while the World Bank oﬀers an oﬃcial FDI deﬁnition which focuses
on an investor’s aim “...to acquire a lasting management interest (usually ten percent
of voting stock)” in an enterprise (World Bank 2001b:xvi), countries enjoy substantial
discretion in assigning a given investment to one of the two categories, and in practice it
6is much harder to distinguish between the two investment modes than suggested by the
oﬃcial deﬁnition.5 We therefore decided to add up the two categories. However, as we
show below, our qualitative results do not change when we use only FDI as the dependent
variable.
While we test the eﬀect of aid on various forms of “equity investment” (i.e. FDI and
portfolio equity investment), we do not consider the debt-creating component of interna-
tional capital ﬂows, such as bank loans and bonds. Hence, our dependent variable is a
subset of total private capital ﬂows that have been considered, for example, by Rodrik
(1995) and Ratha (2001). There are two reasons for our decision to omit debt-creating
capital ﬂows: ﬁrst, we wanted to focus on foreign investment that is, at least in prin-
ciple, aﬀected by the marginal productivity of capital in the receiving economy. While
direct investment satisﬁes this requirement, debt-creating ﬂows may be used for purely
consumption-smoothing purposes or to ﬁnance government consumption. Moreover, re-
cent episodes like the Asian crisis have shown that debt-creating capital ﬂows are much
more volatile than direct investment. Given the large swings in private lending on the one
hand, and the rather slow changes of aid ﬂows on the other, it is not surprising that a lot
of variation in total private capital ﬂows is unexplained by aid and that studies like Bird
and Rowlands (1997) do not ﬁnd a robust relationship between the two variables.
To control for country size, we divide private foreign investment by the receiving coun-
try’s population. The alternative approach of dividing by some measure of national income
(GDP or GNP) that has also been used in the literature is usually justiﬁed as a means to
control for a country’s productivity and the size of the market. However, there is a certain
risk that both the numerator and the denominator of such a ratio are inﬂuenced by the
same factors. Since this procedure could lead to a situation in which the total volume
of private foreign investment is reacting to changes in some exogenous variable while the
share of private foreign investment in GDP is not, it may convey a wrong idea about the
5The World Bank (2001a) acknowldeges this problem by stating that “...as a guideline, the IMF
suggests that investments should account for at least 10 percent of voting stock to be counted as foreign
direct investment. In practice, many countries set a higher threshold”. See Harms (2000) for a discussion
of this issue.
7determinants of private foreign investment, and we therefore chose the per-capita normal-
ization.
3.2 Sample
Our sample is based on countries that are classiﬁed as low-income or middle-income coun-
tries in WDI2001. We only include countries with a population above 1 million and, for
lack of data and due to reliability problems, leave out ex-Soviet and ex-Yugoslav republics.
Data availability is also one of the reasons why we restrict our attention to the 1990s. The
other reason is that, after the “lost decade” of the 1980s, this period has been charac-
terized by substantial private capital ﬂows to emerging markets. Using annual data from
1988 to 1999 we smooth out cyclical ﬂuctuations by creating three-year averages for all
variables. As a result, we consider values for the four intervals 1988-90, 1991-93, 1994-96
and 1997-99, with the 1988-90 subperiod serving as an initial condition (due to the use of
lags). Note that our data set makes up an unbalanced panel: not all variables are available
across all time periods for each country.6 More details on the data can be found in the
data appendix that also features a table with descriptive statistics.
3.3 Regressors
3.3.1 Aid
The aid variable (A) used in our analysis also comes from WDI2001 and is refered to as
“oﬃcial development assistance and net oﬃcial aid”. It consists of international transfers
of i) ﬁnancial resources and ii) goods or services, including grants by oﬃcial donors. It also
includes loans with a grant element of at least 25% and the value of technical cooperation
and assistance; deducted from this are repayments of loan principal.7 As with private
6We started out with 92 countries, but due to missing data most full-sample estimates are based on
between 70 and 81 countries.
7Chang et al. (1998) have created an alternative measure, eﬀective development assistance (EDA),
which only includes the grant component of concessionary loans. Since the bulk of aid during the early and
mid-nineties consisted of pure grants (Hjertholm and White 2000), it is not surprising that the evolution
of EDA closely follows the time path of oﬃcial development assistance. Hence, while we could not use the
8foreign investment, our aid variable is measured in US dollars and divided by population.
We will demonstrate below that our results do not change when we replace this aid variable
by pure grants or technical cooperation grants and when we separately consider bilateral
and multilateral aid.
3.3.2 Governance
To control for the political and institutional environment, we use a new set of measures
provided by Kaufmann et al. (1999)8.T h i sd a t as e to ﬀers six aggregate indicators of
the quality of governance (Q): voice and accountability, political instability and violence,
government eﬀectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and graft.
The ﬁrst advantage of this new data set is that it is based on a systematic aggre-
gation of governance indicators from diﬀerent sources. Hence, while previous studies on
the importance of the institutional environment may have been driven by the selection
of a particular source, the Kaufmann et al. data reﬂect a consensus view shared by di-
verse institutions and enterprises. The second advantage of the new data set is that it
allows to clearly distinguish between diﬀerent aspects of “governance”, each of which re-
ﬂects a distinct component of the political and institutional environment. Hence, voice
and accountability and political instability refer to the political process through which an
authority is selected. Government eﬀectiveness and regulatory burden reﬂect the govern-
ment’s capacity to implement sound policies. Finally, graft and the rule of law depend on
the citizens’ and the bureaucracy’s respect for the oﬃcial rules (Kaufmann et al., 1999:2).
The governance indicators are purely cross-sectional, and the underlying data refer to
1997 and 1998. Since there are no earlier observations, our econometric approach is based
on the implicit assumption that the quality of governance did not change signiﬁcantly
during the 1990s and can thus be approximated by the 1997/8 value. We will later examine
whether this assumption biases our results by estimating separate regressions for each time
period.
Chang et al. (1998) data for lack of data availability — they are not available for the years 1996-99 — we do
n o te x p e c tt h i st ob ec r u c i a lf o ro u rr e s u l t s .
8The data can be downloaded at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.htm#1998.
9The original indicators in Kaufmann et al. (1999) are centered around zero, ranging
from around −2.5 to approximately 2.5, with a higher score indicating better governance.
Since we will later interact the governance indicators with our measure of aid, we rebase
each indicator by adding the minimum value in our sample, thus making sure that the
indicators do not assume negative values. Basic descriptive statistics of the six indica-
tors are reported in Table A1 in the data appendix. Correlation coeﬃcients between the
individual governance measures are all positive and above 50%. However, some of the indi-
cators are more closely correlated than others. The closest correlation is between the pairs
‘government eﬀectiveness/graft’ and ‘rule of law/political instability and violence’. As a
visual illustration, Figure A1 presents three bivariate scatter plots. All three feature reg-
ulatory burden, the governance indicator that turns out to be the most important in our
econometric work.9 The positive correlation with the other indicators is clearly visible, but
there is also a great deal of variation, i.e. a given quality of governance in one direction is
associated with a wide range of values in another direction. This illustrates that countries
that perform well in one dimension of governance do not necessarily perform well in other
dimensions.
3.3.3 Control variables
In addition to aid and governance, the estimation features a range of other control variables
(from WDI2001 unless indicated otherwise). These include: the logarithm of per-capita in-
come (in PPP adjusted US dollars) as a measure of economic development; the sum of
exports and imports divided by GDP to capture openness to trade; and the logarithm of
GDP (in PPP adjusted US dollars) to control for market size. These three variables are
lagged by one period to reduce potential problems of endogeneity. We also include a mea-
sure of equity investment risk which reﬂects the likelihood of expropriation and repudiation
of contracts by the host country government (commercially available from Political Risk
9The regulatory burden variable “includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such
as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions imposed by excessive regulation in
areas such as foreign trade and business development” (Kaufmann et al. 1999:8).
10Services)10. Note that a higher value of this variable indicates a lower degree of risk for
foreign investors. To capture any other unmeasured inﬂuences on the regional and global
investment environment we ﬁnally used regional (from the Global Development Network
database11) and period dummies. In preliminary work we also included the literacy rate
as a proxy for human capital, the inﬂation rate as a indicator of macroeconomic stability,
and the debt-service ratio as a measure of ’debt overhang’, but these variables turned out
to be insigniﬁcant across all speciﬁcations and were therefore removed.
3.4 Econometric model
All the econometric results presented in the next section are based on variants of
pfiit = αt + αj + β1ait + β2(Qi · ait)+β3Qi +
M X
m=1
γmZmit + εit (2)
where pfiit is our measure of private foreign investment and ait our measure of aid (both
in logarithms). Index i =1 ,...,N refers to countries, index t =1 ,...,T to time periods.
Qi is the indicator of the quality of governance and the Zmit variables are the M other
exogenous determinants of private foreign investment. The period dummies are given by
αt and the regional dummies by αj.12 The disturbance term εit is assumed to possess the
usual desirable characteristics.
We ﬁrst estimated diﬀerent versions of (2) by ordinary least squares (OLS), using var-
ious ways to test for signiﬁcance: with i) unadjusted standard errors, ii) heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors (White 1980) and iii) standard errors adjusted for cluster-correlations.
The latter allow not only for country-speciﬁc heteroskedasticity, but also for intra-country
correlation of residuals.13
10Harms (2000) provides a detailed description of these data which are regularly published in the
International Country Risk Guide. We use the arithmetic mean of the two sub-indices, which can range
from zero to ten.
11See http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm.
12Note that we do not use country-speciﬁc dummmies. Since the governance variables do not change
over time, they would simply drop out in a ﬁxed eﬀects regression.
13More details on cluster-adjusted standard errors can be found in Rogers (1993) and Wooldridge (2002,
Section 13.8.2).
11However, the estimates of the various coeﬃcients in (2) are only consistent if all the
right-hand side variables are exogenous. As emphasised by Ratha (2001), there could be a
negative reverse relationship between public and private capital ﬂows if there is a tendency
for oﬃcial lending to rise when private ﬂows are low. Although we are concerned with aid
rather than oﬃcial lending, this possibility may also arise in our context if, for instance,
more aid is given during ﬁnancial crises. Controlling for potential endogeneity of aid has
also been a feature of recent studies on the link between aid and growth.
To be on the safe side, we therefore estimated the relationship in (2) by 2SLS (two-
stage least squares) and GMM (generalised method of moments) as well. The additional
instruments excluded from the private foreign investment equation were: the logarithm of
population; lagged arms imports as a percentage of total imports; the lagged literacy rate;
the logarithm of lagged aid per capita; a dummy for fuel exporters; a dummy indicating
French legal origin; and a dummy indicating British legal origin.14 In those speciﬁcations
where aid also appears non-linearly (e.g. in the interactive term), we followed Hansen and
Tarp (2001) and BD by also including squares and/or cross-products of these instruments
(except for the dummies). All the additional variables used as instruments were extracted
from WDI2001, except for the legal origin variables which were taken from the Global
Development Network database.
In common with BD, we ﬁnd that — on the basis of Durbin-Wu-Hausman-type tests —
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that aid is exogenous for private foreign investment.
Since standard OLS provides consistent estimates in this case, we decided to present mostly
those estimates, but using standard-errors adjusted for cluster-correlations (as described
above) for inference.15 However, as we demonstrate below, our key ﬁndings are robust —
and in many cases even reinforced — if we apply alternative estimation techniques.
14In our choice of instruments we followed BD, Alesina and Dollar (2000), Alesina and Weder (2002),
Hansen and Tarp (2001), Knack (2001), and Ratha (2001).
15White-tests, as well as Pagan-Hall-tests (Pagan and Hall 1983) that are robust to potential endogeneity
lead us to reject the hypothesis of homoskedastic errors.
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4.1 Puzzling results
We started by estimating various bivariate and multivariate versions of (2), in which we did
not include the governance variable (Qi) and the interactive term (Qi ·ait). The resulting
estimates of β1 proved to be either signiﬁcant but negative (in the bivariate case), or
insigniﬁcant (when the other control variables were included). While we do not report
these estimates here, we mention them to emphasise that there is no obvious positive
inﬂuence of foreign aid on private foreign investment.16
We then proceeded to include the quality of governance as an additional explanatory
variable, though still excluding the interactive term. The corresponding results are pre-
sented in Table 1. Two results stand out: ﬁrst, even when we control for the institutional
and political environment, there is still no statistically signiﬁcant relationship between aid
and private foreign investment.
The second important result emerging from Table 1 is that all the governance variables
are highly signiﬁcant and, in all cases, a better institutional and/or political environment
has a positive eﬀect on private capital inﬂows. This also holds — though is not reported
i nt h et a b l e—w h e nw eu s et h eﬁrst principal component of the six individual governance
indicators as an aggregate measure. There are some diﬀerences with respect to the size of
the estimates, though. Less regulatory burden, more eﬀective rule of law and a low level of
graft appear to matter quantitatively more than a higher level of voice and accountability
or less political instability and violence.
In addition, we ﬁnd that private foreign investment is positively and signiﬁcantly cor-
related with lagged per capita income, with the openness of an economy (as measured by
the lagged ratio of trade to GDP), with market size (proxied by the logarithm of lagged
GDP) and with a less risky business environment.17
The point estimates of the period dummies rise over time — possibly reﬂecting the rising
16D e t a i l sa r ea v a i l a b l eo nr e q u e s t .N o t et h a tt h e s eﬁndings mirror the results of Boone (1996) and BD
with respect to economic growth and other macroeconomic variables.
17Recall that a higher value of the investor risk variable reﬂects less risk.
13emerging-markets frenzy that characterized the 1990s before the Asian crisis — though the
diﬀerences to 1991-93 are not statistically signiﬁcant in the majority of cases. The estimates
of the region eﬀects reveal that the excluded region — Latin America and the Caribbean
— received more foreign capital on average than any of the other regions in our sample.
Moreoever, most of the regional diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant.
The explanatory power of this regression speciﬁcation is fairly high, ranging from 68%
to nearly 74%, depending on which governance indicator is used. We also include the
results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) tests for exogeneity of ln(aid per capita), using
either ln(aid per capita) lagged as the only instrument (IV1)o ral a r g e rs e to fi n s t r u m e n t s
(IV2).18 The DWH-tests are based on a comparison of the OLS and 2SLS estimates of
our speciﬁcation, though we do not report the latter explicitly (again, details are available
on request). As the results clearly suggest that there is no evidence of an endogeneity
problem, we focus on OLS results in this and the subsequent tables.
Since the validity of the DWH exogeneity tests depends on an appropriate choice of
instruments, we also checked that the instruments are suﬃciently correlated with ln(aid
per capita) and that our exclusion restrictions are warranted. As the partial R2’s for
the excluded instruments were always in excess of 40% and highly signﬁcant, the ﬁrst
criterion is clearly satisﬁed here. To test the exclusion restrictions, Table 1 reports Sargan-
test results based on 2SLS estimates. They clearly indicate that these restrictions are
supported by the data. In addition, we estimated our model by GMM (see Table 3) and
correponding J-tests conﬁrmed these results. To be on the safe side, we also i) tested
the orthogonality assumption for each excluded instrument individually19 and ii) included
them in our regression to check whether we had not accidentally omitted them. Since these
tests did not indicate any problems either, we are conﬁdent that our instruments possess
the desirable characteristics and that our exogeneity test results are reliable.
To further explore the relationship between private foreign investment, aid and gov-
18The large instrument set includes ln(aid per capita) lagged, ln(population), arms imports (lagged),
literacy rate (lagged), a dummy for fuel exporters,aFrench legal origin dummy and a British legal origin
dummy.
19See Baum et al. (2003) for an excellent discussion of this method.
14ernance, we added the product of governance and aid to estimate the model exactly as
given in (2). The results are presented in Table 2, again for all six governance indicators.
To focus attention on the important variables, we no longer report the estimates of the
period and regional dummies (though details are available). At ﬁrst glance, adding the
interactive term does not seem to make a big diﬀerence: the coeﬃcients of the aid variable
turn positive in many cases, but in most speciﬁcations the isolated eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
There is one important exception, though: column 2.4 shows that if we use the indicator of
regulatory burden to control for the institutional environment, the direct eﬀect of aid on
private foreign investment is positive and signiﬁcant. However, and this is most surprising,
the coeﬃcient of the interactive term (Qi · ait)i ss i g n i ﬁcant and has a negative sign.
The key implication of this ﬁnding is that the marginal eﬀect of aid on private capital
ﬂows, ∂pfiit/∂ait =1 .173 − 0.473 · Qi, can be positive or negative, depending on the
value of Qi. Evaluated at the mean value of the regulatory burden variable (2.44) in this
sample, the marginal eﬀect is close to zero (0.02)a n di n s i g n i ﬁcant. This suggests that,
for the country with an “average regulatory burden”, there is no impact of foreign aid
on private foreign investment and explains why we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of aid
when we did not include the interactive term (Recall column 1.4 in Table 1). Surprisingly,
however, the eﬀect of aid becomes strongly positive in countries with a low value for the
regulatory-burden variable, i.e. where ﬁrms have to cope with substantial restrictions on
their activities.
Figure 1 oﬀers a stylized illustration of this result: for countries that are characterized
by a favorable regulatory environment (Qi high), increasing aid ﬂows have a negative
eﬀect on private foreign investment. On the other hand, foreign investment is increasing
in aid if ﬁrms face a heavy regulatory burden (Qi l o w ) .T h i sp a t t e r ni sr e ﬂected in Figure
2, where we plot the logarithm of aid per capita against the predicted value d pfiit =
1.173 · ait +2 .567 · Qi − 0.473 · Qi · ait. For the left panel we used the observations with
the highest values of the regulatory burden variable. As in Figure 1, the predicted value of
private foreign investment is decreasing in the value of aid for countries characterized by a
very favorable regulatory environment. By contrast, the right panel shows predicted values
15for the countries that fall into the lowest quartile of the regulatory burden distribution.
In this case, larger aid ﬂows imply greater foreign investments. Note, ﬁnally, that the
marginal eﬀect of the regulatory burden variable is never negative.20 Hence, even the
country that receives the maximum amount of aid would beneﬁt in terms of higher private
foreign investment if it oﬀered a better regulatory environment.
The basic direction of the relationship between foreign private capital inﬂows, aid and
governance that we have found for the regulatory burden variable also applies to the other
ﬁve governance variables. However, the relationship is only signiﬁcant — and much stronger
in terms of the size of the estimated coeﬃcients — for regulatory burden. This underlines
that there are fundamental distinctions between the various concepts of governance. We
now extend our analysis by examining whether our puzzling result is robust to changes in
estimation method, regression speciﬁcation, and choice of variables.
4.2 Robustness checks
Table 3 presents the results obtained when we applied alternative estimation techniques.
We only report the estimates of (2) for regulatory burden, but the fact that the rela-
tionship is neither as strong nor signiﬁcant for the other ﬁve governance indicators is not
aﬀected by the use of alternative estimators (details are available). The other estimators
are 2SLS, HOLS21 and GMM. We also report results for diﬀerent instrument sets and dif-
ferent ways of calculating standard errors (and GMM weighting schemes). Scanning across
the columns of Table 3 reveals that our puzzling ﬁnding is not driven by a particular esti-
mation method:22 a higher degree of regulation increases the eﬀect of aid on private foreign
20The marginal eﬀe c to fr e g u l a t o r yb u r d e no np r i v a t ef o r e i g ni n v e s t m e n ti nc o l u m n2 . 4i s∂pfiit/∂Qi =
2.567 − 0.473 · ait. Even at the maximum value of ait in the sample (5.097; see Table A1), the marginal
eﬀect is positive.
21This is an estimator due to Cragg (1983) — refered to as ‘heteroskedastic OLS (HOLS)’ by Baum et
al. (2003) — which is asymptotically more eﬃcient than OLS in the presence of heteroskedasticity. HOLS is
basically a two-step GMM estimator exploiting the additional moment conditions when there are excluded
exogenous instruments.
22Due to varying data availability for the instruments used, the sample size may diﬀer across estimation
methods.
16investment. The marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean vary somewhat, but never diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from zero. Hence, our result is neither driven by our exogeneity/endogeneity
decision as discussed earlier nor by the particular choice of instruments (simple or large,
i.e. IV1 or IV2). And it should be noted that the t-ratios of the OLS results with cluster-
adjusted standard errors reported in Table 2 (and replicated in column 3.3 of Table 3) are
fairly conservative in comparison with most others reported in the table.23
Having found that our results are robust with respect to estimation techniques, we
wanted to test whether, as suggested by Hansen and Tarp (2001) in relation to the BD
study, the signiﬁcance of the interactive term just reﬂects a non-linear inﬂuence of aid on
private foreign investment. Table 4 contains a variety of speciﬁcations to address this and
other possibilities. To permit comparisons, column 4.1 replicates the baseline estimates
containing our ‘puzzling result’. The second column addresses the possibility that aid may
have a non-linear eﬀect on private foreign investment. Hansen and Tarp (2001) found
that, when they included such a term in a regression explaining growth, the interactive
term stressed by BD was no longer signiﬁcant. In our case, however, adding ln(aid per
capita) squared does not alter the basic results, while the coeﬃcient of the squared term
is insigniﬁcant.
Column 4.3 extends the Hansen-Tarp idea to also include squares of the other four
explanatory variables. There is some evidence that openness may have a non-linear inﬂu-
ence on private foreign investment, but our basic results relating to aid and regulatory
burden are unaﬀected by this alteration. We also checked whether our result is driven by
diﬀerences in incomes: the negative sign of the interactive term might just reﬂect the fact
that per-capita income is positively correlated with the quality of the regulatory environ-
ment and that the inﬂuence of aid on foreign investment is weaker in richer economies. In
this case, aid interacted with income should have a negative coeﬃcient and the negative
eﬀect of the original interaction term should disappear. Column 4.4 shows that this is
not the case: the interaction term with relative income per capita is positive and weakly
23In the presence of heterogeneity, GMM is more eﬃcient than 2SLS. However, due to the problematic
properties of the GMM estimator in small samples, the associated t-statistics should be interpreted with
caution (see Hayashi 2000 and Baum et al. 2003).
17signiﬁcant, while the product of aid and the regulatory burden measure is still negative.
Finally, we checked whether the regulatory burden variable just picks up the eﬀect of eq-
uity investment risk. We felt that this might be important since — as indicated by Table 2
—b o t ht h ec o e ﬃcient (in absolute value) and the level of signiﬁcance of the risk indicator
decreased substantially when regulatory burden was used, compared to the other gover-
nance variables. However, as shown by column 4.5, adding an interaction term of aid and
equity investment risk does not aﬀect our basic result.
Next we examined the robustness of our key ﬁnding across diﬀerent subperiods, country
groups and frequencies. Table 5 reports the corresponding results. Distinguishing between
time-periods is useful since one limitation of the Kaufmann et al. (1999) governance in-
dicators is that they refer to 1997-98, while we consider foreign aid and investment ﬂows
for an entire decade. The results in columns 5.1-5.3 of Table 5 reveal that our result is
stronger during the mid- and late-1990s than during the beginning of the decade, where
the key coeﬃcients point in the same direction as before, but are insigniﬁcant. The reason
for this ﬁnding may be that during the ﬁrst time interval, capital movements were still
restricted in many economies, and that private foreign investment was therefore less sensi-
tive to the economic and institutional environment. This possible explanation is supported
by the fact that, according to the estimated marginal eﬀects (evaluated at the mean), the
positive impact of aid was rising during the decade.
Running separate regressions for diﬀerent country groups is another way of examing
the structural stability of our results. Columns 5.4 and 5.5 demonstrate that our key
result still holds when we consider low- and middle-income countries separately. This
is particularly important since one diﬀerence between regulatory burden and the other
governance variables is that it has a distribution which is more skewed to the left and more
heavily peaked (see Table A1). Hence, a lot of observations are amassed in the immediate
neighborhood of the mean, and it could be that our result is driven by some countries with
a very low rating. The lowest ratings apply to Zaire, Guinea Bissau, and Sierra Leone — all
low-income countries. The fact that our result still holds when we focus on middle-income
countries demonstrates that it is not driven by a few extreme observations.
18In columns 5.6-5.7 we examine whether our choice of three-year averages could have
biased our results. Column 5.6 reports results for annual data24 — i.e. no averaging at all
— while column 5.7 reports the results we got when we averaged across the entire period
from 1991-99. Again, there is no fundamental change in our key results: the eﬀect of aid on
private foreign investment is greater when the degree of regulation is high. Similarly, the
marginal eﬀect of aid on private foreign investment remains insigniﬁcant when evaluated
at the mean.
Table 6 ﬁnally demonstrates that our qualitative ﬁndings are not aﬀected by i) our
choice of aid variable and ii) the aggregation of FDI and portfolio equity investment into a
composite measure of foreign private investment. In columns 6.1 and 6.2 we removed the
loan component of aid and focused purely on grants and technical cooperation grants.25 In
columns 6.3 and 6.4 we distinguish between bilateral and multilateral aid. In columns 6.5
and 6.6 we ﬁnally estimate separate regressions for the two components of private foreign
equity investment per capita.26
5A t e n t a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n
5.1 A simple model
In this section, we extend the framework presented in the introduction and develop a simple
model that is able to replicate the puzzling ﬁnding reported above — that is, the negative
sign of the interactive term, which suggests that the positive eﬀect of aid on private foreign
investment is stronger in economies where agents face a high regulatory burden. We start
by showing why larger frictions may reinforce the positive “infrastructure eﬀect” of foreign
24We can only use data up to 1997 since the investor risk variable is not available for 1998 and 1999.
25According to the World Bank (2001b), the deﬁning feature of grants (as part of oﬃcial development
assistance) is that there is no repayment requirement. Technical cooperation grants “...include free-standing
technical cooperation grants, which are intended to ﬁnance the transfer of technical or managerial skills or
of technology”, and “...investment-related technical cooperation grants which are provided to strengthen
the capacity to execute speciﬁc investment projects” (World Bank 2001b).
26The additional data series are again taken from WDI2001, except for bilateral and multilateral aid
which comes from the OECD’s International Development Statistics 2001 CD-Rom.
19aid. This model will later be modiﬁed to also allow for a negative marginal eﬀect resulting
from counter-productive rent-seeking.
Our model economy is populated by a continuum of households who inelastically supply
one unit of labor in every time period. Perfectly competitive ﬁrms produce a homogeneous
traded good whose price is given by world markets and normalized to one. The technology
used for production is given by
Y T =( KT)α(LT)β(X)1−α−β, (3)
where KT and LT denote the amounts of physical capital and labor used in the production
of the traded good Y T,a n dX represents a nontraded input. We assume that all capital
i so w n e db yf o r e i g nﬁrms and that capital completely depreciates in every period. This
allows us to identify the capital stock KT with the volume of private foreign investment
which, for simplicity, we henceforth call FDI.
Part of the nontraded input which we interpret as the country’s infrastructure is pro-
vided free of charge by the government.27 We assume that the amount of the nontraded
input provided by the government, G, is proportional to the volume of foreign aid.28
If ﬁrms desire to use more of the nontraded input than provided by the government,
they can employ labor to increase X. We assume that ﬁrms will always ﬁnd it desirable
to produce some amount of the nontraded input themselves, i.e. we impose
Assumption 1 The amount of the nontraded input provided by the government, G,i s
smaller than the optimal amount used by ﬁrms in the absence of government provision,
X∗.
The productivity of labor in producing the nontraded input depends on the institutional
environment:t h em o r ef r i c t i o n sﬁrms face in forms of regulatory barriers, corruption etc.,
27What we have in mind is a fairly wide deﬁnition of infrastructure, encompassing roads, telephone lines
and electricity as well as less measurable items like education or a reliable and well-functioning bureaucracy.
28Note that we do not make any assumption about the fungibility of aid. It is a well-established fact that
a given amount of foreign transfers earmarked for speciﬁc purposes does not raise government spending on
these purposes by the same amount — either because funds are diverted or because domestically ﬁnanced
government spending is reduced (Feyzioglu et al. 1998). However, all we need for our model is that some
share of foreign aid received by the government is used productively.
20the greater the amount of labor they have to employ to produce a given volume of this
input. We denote the intensity of such frictions by the parameter µ>0 and write the





where LX represents labor devoted to the (private) production of the nontraded input.
When deciding how much labor to employ in the production of the traded good and
the nontraded input, respectively, ﬁrms make sure that the marginal productivity of labor
in both uses is equalized. Given the production function in (3), this implies
β
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Using (4), (5), and the fact that total employment in the economy is normalized to one,




(1 + µG). (6)
This result has a straightforward interpretation: ﬁrst, a poor regulatory environment —
reﬂected by a high value of µ — reduces the productivity of labor in the production of the
nontraded input and therefore induces ﬁrms to shift more labor to the production of the
traded good. Second, if the government provides a large amount of the nontraded input —
i.e. if G is high — this also reduces the marginal productivity of labor in the production
of the nontraded input and raises LT. Put diﬀerently: the greater the amount provided
by the government and the worse the regulatory environment (reﬂected by a high value of
µ), the lower the amount of labor ﬁrms devote to the production of the nontraded input.
5.2 Comparative static analysis
Having determined the allocation of the labor force, we can now compute the optimal
capital stock, which — due to our assumptions on the rate of depreciation and the owner-
ship structure — we identify with the level of FDI. In every period, the marginal product
of capital has to be equal to the exogenous world interest rate r p l u so n e( t h er a t eo f
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. This expression can be used to derive our key com-
parative static results, which we summarize in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The level of FDI, KT, is increasing in the volume of foreign aid, G,a n d
decreasing in the regulatory burden µ.T h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of G is stronger the higher the
regulatory burden.
Proof. The ﬁrst result follows directly from taking the ﬁrst derivative of KT with
respect to G. For the second result we need Assumption 1. The ﬁrst derivative of KT with
respect to µ is negative iﬀ G<(1 − α − β)/(βµ). Comparing this with the optimal level
of private input in the absence of government provision X∗ =( 1− α − β)/[(1 − α)µ],i t
is easy to show that G<X ∗ (Assumption 1) implies G<(1 − α − β)/(βµ).T h et h i r d
result follows directly from taking the appropriate cross derivative.
Our simple model thus suggests that a higher level of aid-ﬁnanced infrastructure at-
tracts more FDI. This is due to the fact that raising G lowers the amount of labor that
is devoted to the production of non-traded inputs and thus increases LT.Ah i g h e rl e v e l
of LT, in turn, has a positive eﬀect on the marginal productivity of capital and thus on
optimal investment. The beneﬁcial eﬀect of foreign aid is stronger if the regulatory envi-
ronment is bad, i.e. if the private sector is hampered in its production of the nontraded
input: if µ is high, ﬁrms provide a low level of X since production is costly. However,
starting from a low level, increasing X has a strong eﬀect on the marginal productivity of
capital and thus on FDI. Put diﬀerently: the greater the impediments for the private sector
to produce the necessary nontraded input, the more important it is that the government
is able to ﬁnance at least some amount of this input. Since, by assumption, government
spending is proportional to foreign aid, this mechanism explains the negative eﬀect of the
interactive term in our regressions.29
29Recall that the Kaufmann et al. (1999) indicator of the regulatory burden increases in the quality of
the regulatory environment.
22This does not mean, of course, that regulation is good for FDI. Quite on the contrary,
as both our comparative static results and our empirical ﬁndings show: the direct eﬀect
of a bad institutional environment on foreign direct investment is negative. Even if the
government oﬀers a certain level of infrastructure, high regulation introduces a distortion
a n dt h u sl o w e r st h el e v e lo fX, which reduces the economy’s attractiveness for foreign
investors.
5.3 Including the rent-seeking eﬀect
In contrast to our empirical results, the model so far predicts a strictly positive marginal
eﬀect of G (foreign aid) on KT (private foreign investment), regardless of µ.W ec a n
easily modify our setup to include a counter-productive “rent-seeking eﬀect” such that the
composite impact of aid on FDI may turn negative. We follow the structure sketched in
the introduction by making productivity dependent on the level of foreign aid G and on
the friction parameter µ.M o r es p e c i ﬁcally, total factor productivity is lowered by (aid-
ﬁnanced) government spending, and this eﬀect is reinforced by a high value of µ.T h e
modiﬁed production function looks as follows:
Y T =( 1+µγG)
(α−1) (KT)α(LT)β(X)(1−α−β), (8)














Taking the ﬁrst derivative of KT with respect to G reveals that KT is decreasing in the
volume of foreign aid if µ<1 and increasing if µ>1.H e n c e ,i fﬁrms face a serious
regulatory burden (µ>1), the negative rent-seeking eﬀect of aid is dominated by the
positive infrastructure eﬀect while it is the other way round if µ<1. Finally, the second
result from Lemma 1 still holds: regulation per se has a negative eﬀect on FDI.
236 Summary and conclusions
When we started out to explore the empirical eﬀect of aid on private foreign investment, we
expected to ﬁnd an open-economy version of the Burnside and Dollar (2000) result: that aid
enhances private foreign investment in a good regulatory and political environment, while
it is ineﬀective or even detrimental if the institutional environment is poor. Surprisingly,
the relationship turned out to be much more complex: on average, higher aid has no
eﬀect on private foreign investment, but the eﬀect is strictly positive if investors face a
substantial regulatory burden.
The ﬁrst conclusion we can draw from this ﬁnding is, once more, that it is crucial to
account for institutional and political factors when assessing the eﬀect of aid on economic
activity. If we had neglected the role of the institutional environment, we would have ended
up with a result similar to Boone’s (1996) ﬁnding that aid is essentially ineﬀective.
As we have emphasized repeatedly, the fact that the positive impact of aid is stronger
in countries with a bad institutional environment does not imply that countries should
further turn the regulatory screw to attract foreign ﬁrms. The opposite is the case: as our
empirical results show, removing institutional frictions is still the best way to increase the
volume of foreign investment. In this respect, our ﬁndings are in line with conventional
wisdom. Where they diﬀer is in their implication that, in a bad regulatory environment,
aid need not be wasteful or even counterproductive.
The purpose of our simple model was to illustrate why this might be the case. The
bottom line of the model was that foreign aid can be beneﬁcial by replacing suppressed
private initiative. Of course, this need not be the only explanation, and one might speculate
about alternative mechanisms that could have generated our empirical result. In this sense,
our paper should rather be read as an invitation for further research than as a deﬁnitive
statement on the relationship between oﬃcial aid and private foreign investment.
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27Data Appendix
We employ data from the following sources: the CD-Rom version of the World Development Indicators 2001
(World Bank 2001a), Global Development Finance (World Bank, 2001b), Kaufmann et al. (1999), Global Devel-
opmemt Network (GDN) database, Political Risk Services and the OECD’s International Development Statistics
2001 on CD-Rom. The variables are deﬁned as follows:
• Net foreign direct investment inﬂows:N e ti n ﬂows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest
(10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the
investor (sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital
as shown in the balance of payments) (current U.S. dollars). Source: World Bank (2001a).
• Portfolio equity investment inﬂows (net): Non-debt-creating portfolio equity ﬂows (the sum of country
funds, depository receipts, and direct purchases of shares by foreign investors) (current U.S. dollars).
Source: World Bank (2001a).
• Private foreign investment: Sum of net foreign direct investment inﬂows and portfolio equity investment
inﬂows (current US dollars). Source: World Bank (2001a).
• Population: Total population. Source: World Bank (2001a).
• Aid:O ﬃcial development assistance and net oﬃcial aid (current US dollars). Source: World Bank (2001a).
• Grants: Legally binding commitments that obligate a speciﬁc value of funds available for disbursement
for which there is no repayment requirement, excluding technical cooperation grants (current US dollars).
Source: World Bank (2001b).
• Technical cooperation grants: Free-standing technical cooperation grants, which are intended to ﬁnance
the transfer of technical or managerial skills or of technology, and investment-related technical cooperation
grants which are provided to strengthen the capacity to execute speciﬁc investment projects (current US
dollars). Source: World Bank (2001b).
• Multilateral aid:N e ta i dﬂows from DAC donors and Arab donors (current US dollars). Source: OECD
(2001).
• Bilateral aid: Total net aid ﬂows less multilateral aid (current US dollars). Source: OECD (2001).
• GDP: Gross domestic product (current international dollars), PPP basis. Source: World Bank (2001a).
• Income per capita: GDP divided by population.
• Relative income per capita = income per capita divided by period-speciﬁcm e a n s .
• Openness: Exports plus imports (as a % of GDP). Source: World Bank (2001a).
• Literacy rate: 100 - adult total illiteracy rate (% of people ages 15 and above). Source: Illiteracy rate data
is from World Bank (2001a).
• Arms imports: Arms imports (as % of GDP). Source: World Bank (2001a).
• Investor risk: Mean of two indicators (likelihood of expropriation of private investment; repudiation of
contracts) from the IRIS-3 ﬁle of the International Country Risk Guide. Source: Political Risk Services.
28• Voice and accountability: Based on up to six sources of indicators relating to the political process, civil
liberties and political rights. Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999).
• Political instability and violence: Based on up to seven sources of indicators relating to the likelihood that
a government will be destabilised or overthrown unconstitutionally and/or violently. Source: Kaufmann
et al. (1999).
• Government eﬀectiveness: Based on up to eight sources of indicators relating to the quality of the bureau-
cracy and public services, the competence and independence of civil servants, and government credibility.
Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999).
• Regulatory burden: Based on up to seven sources of indicators relating to market-unfriendly policies and
excessive regulation on business and trade. Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999).
• Rule of law: Based on up to ten sources of indicators relating to crime, the quality of the judiciary and
the enforceability of contracts. Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999).
• Graft: Based on up to ten sources of indicators relating to the perception of corruption. Source: Kaufmann
et al. (1999).
• French legal origin: Dummy variable equal to one when the legal origin is French. Source: GDN.
• British legal origin: Dummy variable equal to one when the legal origin is British. Source: GDN.
• Fuel exporter: Dummy variable equal to one for all countries where fuel makes up at least 25% of exports.
Source: fuel as % of exports data are from World Bank (2001a).
• Regional dummies: Dummy variables equal to one if country belongs to a speciﬁcr e g i o n( Latin America
and Caribbean, East Asia and Paciﬁc, East Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, South
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa). Source: GDN.
• Time dummies: Dummy variables equal to one for the speciﬁc period (1994-96, 1997-99).
The countries in the sample were chosen as follows. Initially, we selected all 157 countries classiﬁed as low-income
countries or middle-income countries in the WDI2001. We then deleted countries with a population below 1
million, countries without any data on either both or one of the components of private foreign investment (as
deﬁned above), and countries either not featured in the Kaufmann et al. data set, or without data on regulatory
burden. In addition, Ethiopia and the Republic of Yemen were left out since their borders changed during the
sample period (earlier data refer to a diﬀerent geographical area). This left the following 92 countries in the
sample, classiﬁed by income according to the classiﬁcation in GDN:
• Low income countries: Angola, Bangladesh, (Benin), Burkina Faso, (Burundi), (Cambodia), Cameroon,
(Chad), China, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Cote d’Ivoire*, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau*, Haiti*, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, (Lao PDR), (Lesotho), (Liberia), Madagascar, Mala-
wi*, Mali*, (Mauritania), Mongolia, Mozambique, (Myanmar), (Nepal), Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pak-
istan, (Rwanda), Senegal, Sierra Leone*, (Somalia), (Sudan), Tanzania, Togo*, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
• Lower middle-income countries: Algeria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Repub-
lic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran*, Jamaica, Jordan*, Morocco, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, South Africa*, Sri Lanka, (Swaziland), Syrian Arab Republic,
Thailand, Tunisia.
29• Upper middle-income countries: Argentina, Botswana*, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic*, Gabon*, Hungary,
Korea* (Rep.), Lebanon, Malaysia*, (Mauritius), Mexico, (Oman), Panama, Poland, Slovak Republic,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey*, Uruguay, Venezuela.
The baseline regressions with 76 countries and 210 observations in Table 2 do not include the countries in
parentheses. An asterisk (*) indicates that one or two observations are missing for a given country.
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
ln(foreign private investment p.c.) 2.592 -3.876 6.418 1.972 -0.544 3.080
ln(aid p.c.) 2.954 -2.446 5.097 1.265 -1.025 4.359
Voice and accountability 1.610 0.124 3.093 0.716 0.035 2.239
Political instability and violence 2.283 0.000 3.832 0.775 -0.662 3.421
Government effectiveness 1.481 0.000 2.935 0.580 -0.092 2.892
Regulatory burden 2.436 0.000 3.573 0.622 -1.208 5.399
Rule of law 1.830 0.000 3.238 0.648 -0.131 2.731
Graft 1.197 0.000 2.596 0.499 0.310 3.320
ln(income p.c.) (lagged) 7.825 6.087 9.423 0.817 -0.179 1.991
Openness (lagged) 31.153 7.460 92.298 14.152 1.063 4.673
ln(GDP) (lagged) 24.281 20.481 28.795 1.628 0.343 2.690
Investor risk 7.611 2.883 10.000 1.601 -0.753 2.905
1994-96 0.348 0.000 1.000
1997-99 0.352 0.000 1.000
East Asia and Pacific 0.114 0.000 1.000
East Europe and Central Asia 0.090 0.000 1.000
Middle East and North Africa 0.105 0.000 1.000
South Asia 0.057 0.000 1.000
















ln(foreign private investment p.c.) -0.220 0.678 0.096 0.682 0.287 0.271 0.633
ln(aid p.c.) -0.018 0.851 -0.375 0.261 -0.726 -0.313
Regulatory burden 0.466 0.501 0.088 0.148 0.492
ln(aid p.c.)*reg. Burden -0.080 0.255 -0.520 -0.033
ln(income p.c.) (lagged) 0.126 0.481 0.669
Openness (lagged) -0.379 0.169
ln(GDP) (lagged) 0.511
Correlation Coefficients
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Figure 2: Predicted foreign private investment due to aid, regulatory burden and interactive term.











Rule of law Graft
ln(aid per capita) 0.126 0.148 0.103 -0.023 0.147 0.137
[1.05] [1.21] [0.86] [0.25] [1.26] [1.20]
Governance 0.430 0.635 0.715 1.215 0.973 0.848
[2.06]* [3.01]** [2.86]** [4.29]** [4.11]** [3.09]**
ln(income per capita) (lagged) 0.643 0.830 0.633 0.681 0.556 0.555
[2.48]* [3.48]** [2.42]* [3.13]** [2.02]* [1.99]+
Openness (lagged) 0.035 0.033 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.033
[3.37]** [3.07]** [3.27]** [3.08]** [2.92]** [3.08]**
ln(GDP) (lagged) 0.245 0.248 0.217 0.179 0.251 0.233
[1.68]+ [1.69]+ [1.49] [1.22] [1.69]+ [1.62]
Investor risk 0.368 0.254 0.337 0.151 0.233 0.339
[2.16]* [1.73]+ [2.21]* [1.40] [1.67]+ [2.16]*
1994-96 0.076 0.201 0.122 0.376 0.288 0.116
[0.33] [0.94] [0.59] [2.15]* [1.44] [0.54]
1997-99 0.188 0.343 0.225 0.566 0.470 0.242
[0.70] [1.37] [0.92] [2.80]** [2.01]* [0.95]
East Asia and Pacific -0.747 -0.962 -0.975 -0.250 -1.160 -0.945
[1.43] [2.00]* [1.92]+ [0.52] [2.33]* [1.85]+
East Europe and Central Asia -1.273 -1.514 -1.140 -0.753 -1.465 -1.261
[3.46]** [4.14]** [3.67]** [2.27]* [4.44]** [4.11]**
Middle East and North Africa -2.079 -2.337 -2.441 -1.317 -2.811 -2.400
[3.49]** [4.71]** [4.57]** [3.67]** [5.67]** [4.46]**
South Asia -2.093 -1.732 -1.891 -1.599 -2.183 -2.219
[3.49]** [2.48]* [3.21]** [3.04]** [3.70]** [3.54]**
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.755 -0.710 -0.874 -0.366 -1.098 -1.020
[2.31]* [2.22]* [2.62]* [1.37] [3.16]** [2.76]**
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
R-squared 0.682 0.709 0.703 0.737 0.728 0.701
R-squared adj. 0.661 0.690 0.683 0.719 0.710 0.681
DWH χ
2-test (p-value) (IV1) 0.423 0.316 0.592 0.890 0.471 0.453
DWH χ
2-test (p-value) (IV2) 0.486 0.470 0.654 0.885 0.633 0.569
Sargan test (p-value) (IV2) 0.833 0.344 0.198 0.573 0.517 0.702
Table 1. Private foreign investment, aid and governance: basic estimates.
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(private foreign investment per capita). All regressions were estimated by OLS and
also included a constant (not reported). The numbers in brackets are the estimated t-ratios (absolute values), based
on cluster-adjusted standard errors. The symbols ‘+’, ‘*’ and ‘**’ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. DWH refers to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity of ln(aid per capita), based on a comparison of
OLS and 2SLS estimates (not shown). The excluded instruments used for the 2SLS estimates are: IV1:l n ( aid per capita)
(lagged); IV2:l n ( aid per capita) (lagged), ln(population), arms imports (lagged), literacy rate (lagged), fuel exporter
dummy, French legal origin dummy, British legal origin dummy. The Sargan-test for overidentiﬁcation refers to IV2.S e e
text for further details.











Rule of law Graft
ln(aid p.c.) 0.492 0.724 0.321 1.173 0.342 0.466
[1.11] [1.58] [0.72] [3.49]** [0.83] [1.19]
Governance 0.921 1.287 1.108 2.567 1.236 1.559
[1.70]+ [2.44]* [1.49] [7.16]** [2.25]* [1.98]+
ln(aid p.c.)*governance -0.187 -0.239 -0.140 -0.473 -0.095 -0.252
[1.05] [1.43] [0.61] [3.79]** [0.58] [1.08]
ln(income p.c.) (lagged) 0.558 0.772 0.594 0.628 0.542 0.536
[1.97]+ [3.20]** [2.24]* [2.97]** [1.97]+ [1.93]+
Openness (lagged) 0.038 0.035 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.034
[3.68]** [3.34]** [3.31]** [3.62]** [3.02]** [3.05]**
ln(GDP) (lagged) 0.312 0.295 0.242 0.292 0.281 0.271
[2.02]* [2.15]* [1.63] [2.25]* [1.79]+ [1.91]+
Investor risk 0.346 0.264 0.322 0.102 0.226 0.315
[2.27]* [2.02]* [2.27]* [1.06] [1.73]+ [2.23]*
Marginal effect of ln(aid p.c.), 
       evaluated at the mean 0.191 0.178 0.114 0.020 0.168 0.163
       (p-value) (0.275) (0.189) (0.406) (0.848) (0.246) (0.235)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
R-squared 0.687 0.719 0.705 0.766 0.730 0.706
R-squared adj. 0.665 0.699 0.683 0.749 0.710 0.685
Table 2. Private foreign investment, aid and governance: including an interactive term.
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(private foreign investment per capita). All regressions were estimated by OLS and
also included a constant, as well as the same period and regional dummies as in Table 1 (but not reported). The numbers
in brackets are the estimated t-ratios (absolute values), based on cluster-adjusted standard errors. The symbols ‘+’, ‘*’
and ‘**’ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
353.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13
               Estimation method: OLS OLS OLS HOLS HOLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM GMM GMM
Standard errors/weighting: robust cluster robust cluster robust cluster robust cluster robust cluster
               IV set: IV1 IV1 IV1 IV2 IV2 IV2 IV1 IV1 IV2 IV2
ln(aid p.c.) 1.173 1.173 1.173 1.261 1.256 1.361 1.356 1.356 1.356 1.361 1.361 1.444 1.475
[4.52]** [4.53]** [3.49]** [5.04]** [3.89]** [4.55]** [4.65]** [4.97]** [4.01]** [4.80]** [3.79]** [5.61]** [4.86]**
Regulatory burden 2.567 2.567 2.567 2.716 2.661 2.960 3.130 3.130 3.130 2.960 2.960 3.252 3.147
[8.03]** [8.76]** [7.16]** [9.40]** [7.43]** [7.80]** [8.38]** [9.42]** [7.88]** [8.42]** [6.92]**[10.39]** [8.35]**
ln(aid p.c.)*regul. burden -0.473 -0.473 -0.473 -0.514 -0.501 -0.586 -0.612 -0.612 -0.612 -0.586 -0.586 -0.645 -0.629
[4.90]** [4.76]** [3.79]** [5.24]** [4.01]** [5.08]** [5.39]** [5.59]** [4.64]** [5.16]** [4.18]** [6.19]** [5.08]**
ln(income p.c.) (lagged) 0.628 0.628 0.628 0.641 0.614 0.620 0.506 0.506 0.506 0.620 0.620 0.541 0.663
[3.71]** [4.04]** [2.97]** [4.23]** [3.02]** [3.65]** [2.77]** [3.27]** [2.36]* [4.02]** [3.01]** [3.64]** [3.47]**
Openness (lagged) 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.042 0.043 0.042 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.042 0.042 0.039 0.035
[5.15]** [4.22]** [3.62]** [5.81]** [4.62]** [5.76]** [4.37]** [4.18]** [3.39]** [5.81]** [4.57]** [4.44]** [3.33]**
ln(GDP) (lagged) 0.292 0.292 0.292 0.348 0.382 0.301 0.241 0.241 0.241 0.301 0.301 0.250 0.253
[2.95]** [3.11]** [2.25]* [4.01]** [3.34]** [2.58]* [1.97]* [1.89]+ [1.41] [2.59]* [1.90]+ [2.09]* [1.75]+
Investor risk 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.052 0.049 0.056 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.056 0.056 0.084 0.109
[1.22] [1.19] [1.06] [0.64] [0.53] [0.67] [0.89] [0.92] [0.82] [0.68] [0.59] [1.02] [1.23]
Marginal effect of ln(aid p.c.), 
       evaluated at the mean 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.009 0.036 -0.065 -0.140 -0.140 -0.140 -0.065 -0.065 -0.132 -0.062
       (p-value) (0.825) (0.789) (0.848) (0.907) (0.925) (0.387) (0.287) (0.317) (0.442) (0.416) (0.725) (0.311) (0.692)
Observations 210 210 210 209 209 209 195 195 195 209 209 195 195
R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.766 0.772 0.771 0.771 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.771 0.771 0.772 0.772
R-squared adj. 0.749 0.749 0.749 0.755 0.755 0.754 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.754 0.754 0.755 0.755
Table 3. Private foreign investment, aid and regulatory burden: diﬀerent estimation methods.
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(private foreign investment per capita). The numbers in brackets are the estimated
t-ratios (absolute values). The symbols ‘+’, ‘*’ and ‘**’ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The estimation methods are ordinary least squares (OLS), heteroskedastic-OLS (HOLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS)
and generalised method of moments (GMM). See Baum et al. (2003) for a description of these estimators.
364.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
ln(aid p.c.) 1.1732 1.1454 1.2107 1.3850 0.8396
[3.49]** [3.01]** [3.01]** [4.04]** [2.08]*
Regulatory burden 2.5670 2.5630 2.5454 2.9031 2.9549
[7.16]** [7.12]** [6.38]** [7.38]** [6.48]**
ln(aid p.c.)*regul. Burden -0.4734 -0.4715 -0.4782 -0.5968 -0.5960
[3.79]** [3.70]** [3.31]** [4.11]** [3.88]**
ln(income p.c.) (lagged) 0.6283 0.6292 -1.5696 0.1188 0.6442
[2.97]** [2.97]** [0.60] [0.34] [3.15]**
Openness (lagged) 0.0361 0.0360 0.0973 0.0322 0.0344
[3.62]** [3.61]** [3.65]** [3.40]** [3.52]**
ln(GDP) (lagged) 0.2923 0.2946 -0.4960 0.2352 0.3008
[2.25]* [2.25]* [0.34] [1.81]+ [2.30]*
Investor risk 0.1016 0.1002 0.1322 0.1124 -0.1520
[1.06] [1.04] [0.39] [1.17] [0.77]
ln(aid p.c.) squared 0.0055 0.0033
[0.19] [0.11]
ln(aid p.c.)*relative income p.c. 0.1847
[1.74]+
ln(aid p.c.)*investor risk 0.0801
[1.47]
ln(income p.c.) (lagged) squared 0.1435
[0.84]
Openness (lagged) squared -0.0007
[2.54]*
ln(GDP) (lagged) squared -0.0056
[0.22]
Investor risk squared 0.018
[0.62]
Marginal effect of ln(aid p.c.), 
       evaluated at the mean 0.02 0.013 0.055 -0.055 -0.003
       (p-value) (0.848) (0.789) (0.546) (0.423) (0.812)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210
R-squared 0.766 0.766 0.776 0.772 0.769
R-squared adj. 0.749 0.747 0.754 0.754 0.751
Table 4. Private foreign investment, aid and regulatory burden: various speciﬁcations.
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(private foreign investment per capita). All regressions were estimated by OLS and
also included a constant, as well as the same period and regional dummies as in Table 1 (but not reported). The numbers
in brackets are the estimated t-ratios (absolute values), based on cluster-adjusted standard errors. The symbols ‘+’, ‘*’
and ‘**’ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.













ln(aid p.c.) 0.929 1.437 1.275 1.354 2.086 1.074 1.246
[1.25] [3.62]** [3.42]** [3.63]** [3.46]** [3.43]** [3.85]**
Regulatory burden 2.416 3.094 2.280 3.211 3.145 2.540 2.495
[2.88]** [6.25]** [6.09]** [6.57]** [5.24]** [7.50]** [6.50]**
ln(aid p.c.)*regul. burden -0.408 -0.614 -0.412 -0.662 -0.765 -0.478 -0.522
[1.49] [3.74]** [3.17]** [4.10]** [3.44]** [4.21]** [4.40]**
ln(income p.c.) (lagged) 0.634 0.500 0.801 0.384 0.630 0.672 0.769
[1.40] [2.36]* [3.20]** [1.01] [1.16] [2.85]** [3.09]**
Openness (lagged) 0.054 0.043 0.031 0.058 0.017 0.034 0.032
[2.98]** [3.12]** [2.96]** [5.67]** [1.36] [4.02]** [3.05]**
ln(GDP) (lagged) 0.403 0.396 0.293 0.371 0.128 0.187 0.156
[2.15]* [2.02]* [2.14]* [2.16]* [0.73] [1.46] [1.04]
Investor risk 0.055 0.109 0.069 -0.074 0.342 0.182 0.196
[0.26] [0.63] [0.64] [0.60] [2.41]* [2.33]* [1.75]+
Marginal effect of ln(aid p.c.), 
       evaluated at the mean -0.085 -0.054 0.284 -0.015 -0.006 -0.092 0.054
       (p-value) (0.578) (0.528) (0.084) (0.937) (0.960) (0.458) (0.738)
Observations 63 73 74 94 116 459 76
R-squared 0.736 0.774 0.826 0.641 0.709 0.716 0.839
R-squared adj. 0.673 0.729 0.791 0.588 0.669 0.704 0.809
Table 5. Private foreign investment, aid and regulatory burden: diﬀerent time periods, country
groups and frequencies.
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(private foreign investment per capita). All regressions were estimated by OLS and
also included a constant, as well as regional dummies. Regressions 5.4-5.6 also included period dummies. The numbers
in brackets are the estimated t-ratios (absolute values), based on cluster-adjusted standard errors except for regression
5.7 where heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. The symbols ‘+’, ‘*’ and ‘**’ denote signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.




























Aid variable 0.975 1.001 1.068 1.180 1.056 2.920
[2.69]** [3.15]** [3.34]** [3.39]** [2.98]** [2.20]*
Regulatory burden 2.051 2.281 2.294 1.769 2.341 3.768
[6.03]** [8.35]** [7.20]** [6.90]** [6.33]** [2.51]*
Aid variable*regul. burden -0.399 -0.548 -0.433 -0.431 -0.421 -1.025
[3.03]** [4.23]** [3.59]** [3.33]** [3.28]** [2.03]*
ln(income p.c.) (lagged) 0.596 0.773 0.563 0.669 0.519 0.617
[2.77]** [3.83]** [2.66]** [3.01]** [2.19]* [1.05]
Openness (lagged) 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.009
[3.58]** [3.71]** [3.68]** [3.91]** [3.85]** [0.49]
ln(GDP) (lagged) 0.254 0.067 0.313 0.338 0.225 0.466
[1.80]+ [0.41] [2.48]* [2.73]** [1.66] [1.46]
Investor risk 0.144 0.095 0.107 0.146 0.084 0.228
[1.51] [1.02] [1.12] [1.53] [0.85] [1.30]
Marginal effect of aid variable, 
       evaluated at the mean 0.001 -0.338 0.018 0.136 0.03 0.232
       (p-value) (0.995) (0.071) (0.815) (0.105) (0.790) (0.321)
Observations 214 214 206 208 211 99
R-squared 0.765 0.777 0.758 0.761 0.729 0.479
R-squared adj. 0.749 0.761 0.740 0.744 0.709 0.392
Table 6. Private foreign investment, aid and regulatory burden: diﬀerent aid and dependent
variables.
Notes: The dependent and aid variables used in each regression are deﬁned at the top of the table. All regressions were
estimated by OLS and also included a constant, as well as the same period and regional dummies. The numbers in
brackets are the estimated t-ratios (absolute values), based on cluster-adjusted standard errors. The symbols ‘+’, ‘*’ and
‘**’ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
39